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1 Introduction
Underground economic activities are a fact of life around the world. Most
societies attempt to control these activities through various measures, for
example, by punishing tax evasion. If tax morale represents a normal good,
promotion of economic growth also serves for the same purpose. By invest-
ing in education, the society can hope to advance desired social values.1 The
existing research has successfully established that illicit economic activities
exist not only in non-industrialized countries but are signi?cant also in west-
ern economies.2 The earlier studies have analyzed two issues in particular,
i.e. payment transactions and measures of underground economic activities.
Empirical knowledge of the frequency of these activities and the magnitude
of them appears important for economic policies which aim at controlling
them. This is, however, hard as individuals engaged in these activities wish
not to be identi?ed. Our paper therefore has a di¤erent focus. Its goal is to
overcome these di¢culties by introducing a theory of the mechanisms and
determinants why shadow economies develop. It then tests the hypothe-
ses suggested by the model using data on OECD countries and the MIMIC
estimation method.
People engage in shadow transactions for the purpose of tax evasion es-
pecially if the government is viewed as a predatory revenue maximizer. Ab-
staining from participation of ?nancing the public goods, those visiting the
illicit markets exert a ?scal externality on honest consumers. However, people
have intrinsic moral sentiments, with preference for obeying inherited social
norms and disapproving deviants. In particular, people care what other peo-
ple think of them and self-esteem is important for them. Free-riders and
deviants are disapproved.3
Our paper explores the determinants of the borderline between legal and
shadow economies. It explores the extent to which moral sentiments can
control for shadow activities. It therefore introduces preferences for moral
standards, determination of morality as social capital and sustainability of
social norms. In the model, we consider explicitly the commodity tax in
allocating consumers between the legal and illicit sectors.4 As a corollary,
1Akerlof (1983) has analyzed the parental incentives to teach their children values
leading them best survive economically.
2Schneider and Enste (2002).
3Fehr and Gächter (2002) indicate that people are willing to invest substantial resources
in public goods, as long as they have the possibility to in?ict punishment on those who
free ride on the co-operation.
4The model could be extended to incorporate the input markets and thereby the income
taxes. In the model, we however abstract from income taxes if only to simplify.
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the paper indicates that illegal transactions are an important determinant of
cash holdings despite the fact that more e¢cient electronic payment system
are at hand.5
In our model, morality is viewed as a network good.6 Apart from con-
sumption opportunities, people value the social approval attached to their be-
havior within the social network sharing the same moral values. By implica-
tion, deviants subject themselves to the risk of being detected and becoming
socially stigmatized. Detection is, however, probabilistic and by anonymous
transactions immoral people may mimic the moral ones. Morality operates
like a particular form of social capital.7 In our model, the degree of moral-
ity is determined by the share of people who choose to commit to honest
behavior.8
The model suggests that high tax rate, low expected cost of punishment
and low relative cost of production shape the industry equilibrium leading
to contraction of the legal sector and a boost in the shadow economy. To
qualify, rising tax rate tends to expand the shadow economy through the
tax evasion e¤ect. There is also an associated public goods e¤ect. Moral
sentiments in terms of self-esteem and disapproval operate as mechanisms
which limit the shadow market activities.
The empirical results of the paper for the 21 developed OECD countries
support the theoretical predictions. Taxation and social security contribu-
tions appear as the driving force of the shadow economy. Moreover, the
5Using cash for payments of illegal anonymous transactions appears as an important
motive for why people hold cash in spite of the recent innovations in the payment system.
Cash payments are convenient for those who seek to hide their motives. The markets
for prostitution, for example, are presumably predominantly based on the use of cash,
reducing the enforceability of within family contracts. Modern brand products like Nike
or Adidas in sportswear and shoes or Prada on ladies fashion are actively copied and
marketed in pirate products. With high legal prices of CDs, people have developed ability
to copy music freely from internet. In construction, illegal labor is employed with the aim
of tax evasion. Many private services are delivered without receipts. In most economies,
there are also well-functioning secondary markets for stolen durable goods. Moreover, the
rise of terrorism is largely ?nanced by illegal money.
6Our model highlights the con?ict between opportunistic private incentives and col-
lective values and norms. Some studies in the sociological literature explain crimes as
an outcome of evolutionary interplay between productive and expropriative strategies, cf.
Cohen and Machalek (1988) and Vila and Cohen (1993).
7The reasons for non-opportunistic behavior have been extensively discussed by biolo-
gists. Hamilton (1964) introduced the notion of kin selection and Trivers (1971) a more
general view of reciprocal altruism. Wilson (1975) represents a comprehensive document of
reciprocal behavior among animals extended to human behavior by Binmore (1998). Frank
(1988) argued convincingly that the ability of people to behave non-opportunistically serves
as a helpful commitment device facilitating bene?cial relations like joint ventures.
8Cf. Frank (1987) for a pioneering analysis of honesty and dishonesty.
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status of the o¢cial economy and the tax morale are shown further to con-
tribute to underground activities. We also observe a substantial increase
of the estimated size of the shadow economy in the 90s in all countries in-
cluded in data. Our estimation results with the MIMIC approach allow us
to link this development to the rising total tax rate in the OECD economies.
Subsequently, however, our estimates suggest that the shadow economy has
started to shrink somewhat in most countries in our sample in the late 1990s
up to 2003. This again is consistent with our model and the fact that the
total tax rate, for example in the EU-area, started on the average to decline
as tax policies were changed. Only in a small sub-set of our sample, i.e. in
Germany, Austria and Switzerland, the shadow economy has expanded also
during the past years.
Our paper is structured as follows. After surveying the previous studies
in section 2, we develop our theoretical model in section 3. The model
is estimated in section 4 which reports the econometric results. Section 5
concludes.
2 Previous Studies
Shadow Economy, its Magnitude and Payment Systems Shadow
economy arises exclusively from government intervention, i.e. regulation and
taxation. Such a policy intervention has side e¤ects. Many empirical stud-
ies show that the size of the shadow economy has been most dramatic in
the planned socialistic economies with maximum governmental intervention9.
However, Giles (1999a) suggests that the size of the shadow economy has been
growing over the past two or three decades in almost all of the countries for
which comparative data have been assembled. According to Giles, growth
in the underground economy is associated with increases in the actual or
perceived tax burden but also with the degree of economic regulation. The
view is shared by Thomas (1999) who hints that a growing shadow economy
may be an indication of over-taxation and over-regulation. He also suggests
that at least some part of the shadow economy may be social security fraud,
making unemployment less bad as it looks.
As early as in 1958, Cagan proposed that people prefer to use cash in
illegal economy, especially in black markets and for tax evasion. Modern
payment systems have sought to challenge cash, but none has been able to
shake the prominent role of money. Thus, Hancock and Humphrey (1998)
conclude that factors other than the simple opportunity cost must play pri-
mary role in determining holdings and the use of cash. After an extensive
9For recent survey and for methodological review see Schneider (2004).
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survey Drehman et al. (2002) conclude that ?bad behavior? creates a demand
for anonymous means of payment which for now is the currency.
Some useful ?gures for understanding the magnitude of illegal demand
for cash are provided, for example, by Rogo¤ (1998). Accordingly, half of
the currency holdings in the OECD countries are in the domestic informal
economy. It appears that informal economy already is the main holder of
cash. Humphrey et al. (2000) suggest, that the technological progress will
further distort the demand as the share of the legal use will decrease and the
share of illegal use will increase. Thus the authorities will face an unpleasant
moral dilemma, as the seigniorage revenues are likely to be due to providing
the means of payment for illegal activities, for example, tax evasion!
Links to Policy There are several conclusions that have been justi?ed in
the light of the above results. Schneider (2000) gives a concerned note by
suggesting that under a growing (or substantial) shadow economy, policy is
based on mistaken o¢cial indicators. In addition, he suggests that a growing
shadow economy attracts workers to work in shadow economy and to work
less in the o¢cial economy. Giles and Caragata (1999) are concerned that
unpaid tax in hidden economy or loopholes allowing abusive avoidance in the
existing tax system create a deadweight loss on the economy. These will, in
turn, undermine taxation equity by shifting tax burden in the direction of
honest, socially responsible individuals and corporations. Accordingly, part
of the hidden economy is learned response to changing opportunities and
constraints in ?scal policy, but on the other hand, there is a threshold level
of underground activity that will sustain.
Theoretical work Theoretical attempts to analyze the shadow econ-
omy include Cowell (1989) who asks how far should taxation authorities
go in pursuit of the missing income. In a paper which is closest to ours,
Acemoglu (1994) analyzes the pecuniary and non-pecuniary aspects of the
reward structure on the allocation of talent across di¤erent activities with
divergent private and social returns. The non-pecuniary aspects of reward
structure consist of social status and prestige received for di¤erent activities.
For example, the prestige and the status are in?uenced by the established
norms and role models and reference groups10.
The determinants and e¤ects of the informal sector are studied in an
endogenous growth model by Loayza (1996). Using data on Latin American
countries it is found that the informal sector negatively a¤ects growth and
its size depends on tax burden, labor-market restrictions and government
10?Bad behavior? may have less damaging stigma when it is more widespread.
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institutions. Johnson et al. (1997) propose that supply of public goods tends
to result in increasing returns in private ?rms, leading to multiple equilibria.
Data on transition economies suggests that market-supporting institutions
are critical for a successful transition. Friedman et al. (2000) suggest that
the incentive to go underground to dodge higher tax rates is outweighed by
the bene?ts of remaining o¢cial.
Camera (2001) analyzes what would happen if authorities promote the
use of e-purse and limit the use of currency. Accordingly, an equilibrium
exists with no illegal production if monitoring is su¢ciently extensive and
money supply is moderate. When enforcement is not too extensive, how-
ever, there are monetary equilibria where legal and illicit production coexist.
Accordingly, the results provide a rationale for limiting the amount of cash
in circulation. Nonetheless, using currency as an exogenous discipline on
illicit undertakings may have unintended consequences, such as depressing
all trading activities and decreasing welfare. Dabla-Norris and Feltenstein
(2003) apply an intertemporal general equilibrium model to explore the link
between tax rates, access to credit and the size of the underground economy.
Simulation results for Pakistan demonstrate that entry into underground
economy can have a cyclical nature. Moreover, the share of underground
activity will decline over time and sectors gradually move back into legal
economy. With low taxes, there is no underground economy, but due to high
budget and trade de?cit the low tax regime is not sustainable over time.
Thus an economy may have to accept some underground activity as part of
an otherwise acceptable tax program.
Davidson, Martin and Wilson (2003) suggest that shadow transactions
may increase welfare. They argue in the experience goods framework that
by allowing agents to self-select into the black market, the government can
target tax breaks to transactions involving low-quality goods. Money in
provision of privacy has been recently addressed by Kahn, McAndrews and
Roberds (2004). Fortin, Lacroix and Villeval (2004) study the link between
tax evasion and social norms and social interactions. The experiment by
Carpenter and Matthews (2004) con?rms the existence of social reciprocity,
demonstrating that more socially e¢cient outcomes arise when reciprocity
can be expressed socially. Earlier, Kandori (1992) followed subsequently by
Araujo (2004) suggested that a community can sustain a social norm with
agents knowing nothing more than their personal experience. The reason is
that defection against one agent causes sanctions by others. Finally, we refer
to Kanniainen and Pääkkönen (2004) which provides the starting point for
the model we introduce below.
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3 Model
3.1 Market Solution and Fiscal Externality
Shadow transactions take a variety of forms (Schneider and Enste (2002)),
including household production, neighborhood help, sales of stolen products,
imperfect reporting by ?rms and self-employed, gambling and drugs. The
existing literature suggests that taxation, not forgetting social security con-
tributions, motivate people to avoid such taxes. In our theoretical model,
we will abstract from input markets and hence from income taxes and social
security contributions in order to keep the model manageable. We consider
explicitly underground transactions arising from tax evasion by consumers.
Building on Kanniainen and Pääkkönen (2004), we formulate a model of an
industry consisting of legal and illicit producer or services or goods. In the
empirical part, we introduce both direct and indirect taxes and social security
payments.
Our research strategy is to analyze ?rst the industry equilibrium when one
sector is taxed and the other is not. Subsequently, we introduce moral stan-
dards to examine their role in controlling the development of shadow econ-
omy. We introduce the budget constraint of a revenue maximizing Leviathan
government.
Anonymous Visits to Shadow Economy Consider a market with a
product brand where a producer has market power in pricing. The product
is assumed to have some prestige value, determining the basic willingness to
pay.11 In such markets, the entry cost is non-trivial because of the nature
of the product or because of barriers to entry. The products are subject
to a commodity tax, ¿ > 0.12 Because of the market power, the producer
is able to shift part of the tax to consumers. The two elements, pricing
power and the tax wedge in consumer price create an incentive for illicit
production. To avoid social punishment, consumers try to visit the illicit
market anonymously.13
11Alternatively, we could think of paternalistically regulated industries, like casinos,
state monopolies in liquor production etc.
12The possibility to avoid the commodity tax by imperfect reporting is product speci?c.
This observation supports the view that the optimal commodity tax is non-uniform, i.e.
products which allow for easy tax evasion should be taxed less heavily. One topical example
is the Finnish tax reduction on strong liquor, aiming at controlling the (legal and illicit)
imports.
13To clarify, when we talk about an illicit producer, this should not be understood to
refer a registered ?rm but to an activity which is rival to legal activity. We also notice that
we abstract from the possibility that the legal ?rm operates partly like an illicit producers
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Consumers Consumers are assumed to have preferences over goods and
social approval. By their intrinsic preferences, people are assumed to be
all alike. They all are egoists in the sense of utility maximizers. But they
also care for what other people think of them.14 Thus, they have subjec-
tive preference both for their self-esteem and they care about the expected
social punishment of illegal actions.15 Thus, morality becomes a network
phenomenon. However, for tax evasion reasons, it may become pro?table to
deviate opportunistically from the norm of buying only legal products. By
anonymous transactions, deviants try to mimic the legal consumers, though
risking themselves to social stigma. Hiding deviations from an established
social norm becomes attractive, as hiding may help to maintain the status
of an honest person.
We ?rst build the market model without moral sentiments. We assume
that consumers di¤er with respect to their willingness to pay for the prestige
of the product brand. We assume that there is continuum of consumers with
mass one. They can buy a private product in the legal or illicit market.
We denote the producer prices by pl; pi: The marginal utility from buying
the private legal product, rk for consumer k; is assumed to be uniformly
distributed over [0; 1]: Consumers also value public goods. We assume that
private goods and public goods are complementary in the sense that the
willingness to pay for the private good is increasing in the amount of public
goods available.16 Consumers visiting the illicit market are assumed to be
caught with probability » > 0 and subject to penalty z > 0: Consumers (k; j)
visiting the legal and illicit market thus are assumed to have net utilities
uk = grk ¡ (1 + ¿ ) pl; vj = grj ¡ z» ¡ pi: (1)
Non-excludability implies that both honest and dishonest consumers de-
rive utility from public goods though the latter ones free-ride in the ?nancing
of those goods.
In the industry equilibrium, we expect segmentation of markets, i.e. those
consumers with high marginal utility rk would buy the legal product while
in the shadow economy. Though such an activity is common in practice, we leave it out if
only to keep the model simple.
14Such a subjective status e¤ect is well-known in psychology, cf. Singh-Manoux, Adler
and Marmot (2003). In biology, we refer to Ridley (1996). In economics, Fershtman, Weiss
and Hvide (2001) have studied status e¤ects.
15Binmore (1998) has shown that it is rational for people to commit to social norms
and social contracts as long as the commitment gains exceed the short-term gains from
deviating. Morality arises in the equilibrium of a repeated game as a social contract.
16The public good is more valuable to a consumer with greater willingness to pay for
the private good.
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those with lower marginal utility buy the illicit product. Denote the marginal
consumers by (m; n) where m is indi¤erent between buying the legal and
illicit product while n is indi¤erent between buying the illicit product and
buying none. Thus the marginal utility for any consumer, k, for buying the
legal product is g(1 ¡ k): The marginal utility for j for buying the illicit
product is g(1¡ j)¡ »z: Insert k = j = m to obtain the expressions for the
marginal consumer. For indi¤erence, g(1¡m)¡(1+¿)pl = g(1¡m)¡»z¡pi:
Note that the market share of the legal production must be xl = m:
The immediate observation is that the consumer price in the legal sector
has to exceed the consumer price in the illicit sector, (1 + ¿)pl > pi: The
price di¤erential is una¤ected by the valuation of public goods. Solving for
the expression for the willingness to pay by the marginal consumer of the
legal product from condition g¡r
m
xl
= g; yields rm = (1¡ xl) g: The condition
g¡rm
xl
= g is obtained from the demand curve. We have a downward-sloping
demand, cutting the vertical axis at g and the horizontal axis at 1 (because
the mass of consumers is 1). The willingness to pay for the private good by
the consumer who is just indi¤erent between legal and illicit goods is rm.
From two triangles with the same slope, we obtain the claimed condition.
To solve for the marginal willingness to pay for the illicit product, we note
that g¡r
n
xi+xl
= g; yielding rn = (1¡ xi ¡ xl) g: Clearly, rm > rn: This implies
that rm ¡ (1 + ¿)pl > 0: By implication, the legal ?rm cannot exploit the
full consumer surplus from its customers. Such a market power of the legal
consumer arises from that she can "blackmail" the legal producer with her
option to visit the illicit market. The illegal producer, in contrast, is able to
exploit the full surplus from its marginal customer.
To summarize, rm > rn > 0: Then we know that all those customers with
a higher product valuation than the marginal customer m will buy the legal
product. The other active customers buy the illicit product. The third group
buys nothing.
Solving for the price di¤erential
(1 + ¿)pl ¡ pi = »z: (2)
What this condition suggests is that a consumer is indi¤erent between
visiting the legal and illicit market if the risk of getting caught and penalized
is fully compensated by the price di¤erential. For the marginal consumer n;
the net utility from buying the illicit product is zero, g(1¡ n)¡ »z ¡ pi = 0:
Noting that the n is the last buyer, i.e. n = xl + xi; her net utility is
(1¡ xl ¡ xi)g ¡ »z ¡ pi = 0: Thus, the valuation of public goods raises the
price of the illicit product. Through the ?rst arbitrage condition, this is then
re?ected in the price of the legal product, too.
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The total production thus satis?es xl + xi = 1 ¡ »z+pig : Solving for the
prices pi = (1¡ xl ¡ xi)g ¡ z»; pl = (1¡xl¡xi)g1+¿ .
Pro?ts Market equilibrium can now be analyzed in terms of competition
with di¤erentiated products. The legal ?rm can take opportunistically ad-
vantage of honest consumers. On the other hand, the illicit market intensi?es
competition. This results in fewer consumers in the legal market, exerting a
pressure on the legal price.17 Consumers buy the product with greater net
utility.18 Under Cournot-competition in di¤erentiated products, the behavior
of ?rms obeys
max
xl
(pl ¡ cl)xl; max
xi
( pi ¡ ci)xi; (3)
where cl; ci > 0 are the production costs.19
Nash equilibrium In Nash equilibrium, market shares satisfy
xl =
g + z» + ci ¡ 2(1 + ¿ )cl
3g
(4)
xi =
g + (1 + ¿ )cl ¡ 2z» ¡ 2ci
3g
: (5)
Similarly, prices are
pl =
g + (1 + ¿ )cl + z» + ci
3 (1 + ¿)
(6)
pi =
g ¡ 2z» + ci + (1 + ¿ )cl
3
(7)
We ?nd that the condition for existence of shadow market in the industry
equilibrium is xi =
g+(1+¿ )cl¡2z»¡2ci
3g
> 0: High tax rate and low expected cost
of punishment and low relative cost of production support the development
of shadow markets. In particular, increased tax on the legal product shakes
17The ?rm producing in the legal market obviously has an incentive to capture the
consumers also in the illicit market. An example is the illegal production of pirate products
of cigarettes in Eastern European countries. The legal ?rm typically then issue licenses to
combat the illegal pirate production.
18One can extend the analysis to quality uncertainty in the illicit market. One of the
recent examples is the Estonian vodka. When bought in illicit markets, it has killed some
consumers.
19The decision to become a producer in the illicit market could be analyzed in terms of
occupational choice. Such a choice would also be subject to moral considerations which,
however, will not be explicitly discussed in the current paper.
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the industry equilibrium leading to contraction of the legal sector and a boost
in the shadow economy.
However, when tax revenue is used to ?nance public goods, these natural
results no longer hold as their validity is limited to the ceteris paribus case.
The role of public goods in the determination of the limits to shadow economy
thus deserves attention. Solving
@xl
@g
=
1
g
(
1
3
¡ xl); @xi
@g
=
1
g
(
1
3
¡ xi): (8)
With large market shares (xl > 13 ; xi >
1
3
); an increase in the supply of
public goods reduces both the size of the legal sector and the illicit sector. It
is only when the market shares are small that the complementarity e¤ect of
public and private goods raises output when more public goods become avail-
able. This somewhat surprising ?nding follows from the pro?t maximizing
behavior of producers. Realizing that the willingness to pay by consumers
for the private products has increased with more public goods available, pro-
ducers can raise their pro?ts by actually cutting the production and charging
higher prices.
3.2 Balanced Budget Requirement
We consider next the case where public goods available are constrained by
the tax revenue generated by taxation of the legal product. In the empirical
analysis, we do not impose this constraint for two reasons. First, governments
can issue public debt, shifting tax burden on future generations.20 Second,
governments can waste part of the tax revenue as activities of special interests
groups and lobbies result in ine¢cient public spending.
Balanced government budget amounts to considering the industry equi-
librium subject to the constraint
g = ¿plxl: (9)
With a given tax rate, such a constraint endogenizes the supply of public
goods in the economy.21 We now have ?ve equations to determine the ?ve
20The dynamics of the impact of public debt on the development of shadow economies
depends on whether the Ricardian equivalence holds or not with a regime shift in tax
policies. With Ricardian equivalence between taxes and public debt, shadow economies
develop fast, as people discount the future taxes. However, with imperfect discounting,
shadow economies emerge over time.
21We consider below the case where the tax rate is determined by revenue maximizing
government.
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endogenous variables (xl; xi; pl; pi; g) in the industry equilibrium. Dishonest
people understand that by free-riding in ?nancing the public goods produc-
tion they also su¤er if the tax revenue is reduced and less public goods are
available. Does this understanding restrict the market share of the shadow
economy? What does the uncoordinated equilibrium look like? Our empiri-
cal results will shed light on these issues.
Suppose that there is a marginal increase in the tax rate ¿ : What hap-
pens to the shadow markets? From the solution above, the new industry
equilibrium satis?es
dxi
d¿
=
cl
3g
+
µ
1=3¡ xi
g
¶µ
dg
d¿
¶
: (10)
We ?nd that if the tax rate is increased, there are two e¤ects. The ?rst one
de?nitively tends to make the shadow economy larger. This can be called the
tax evasion e¤ect and its magnitude is measured by cl=3g. High production
cost in the legal sector makes the tax evasion e¤ect large, while large supply of
public goods has a negative impact on the expansion of the shadow economy.
These e¤ects follow from production decisions by ?rms. There is a secondary
e¤ect which depends on the impact of tax rate on tax revenue and hence
on supply of public goods, dg
d¿
and on the initial market share of the shadow
economy, xi. It is appropriate to call this the public goods e¤ect. Totally
di¤erentiating the budget constraint dg = d¿ (plxl) + ¿ (dplxl + pldxl) and
inserting the market reactions, we ?nd
dg
d¿
=
1
1+¿
³
plxl ¡ ¿cl3
³
xl +
2(1+¿ )cl
g
´´
1¡ 1
3
¿
1+¿
xl +
¿
3
z»+ci¡2(1+¿ )cl
g2
pl
:
The denominator is always positive because 1
3
¿
(1+¿ )
xl < 1: The sign of
numerator is, however, ambiguous. Despite its sign, 1=3¡xi
g
is positive in
when shadow economy is small and negative when it is large. The public
goods e¤ect therefore generates accelerating or decelerating mechanisms on
the expansion of the shadow economy when the tax rate is increased. Those
mechanisms depend on the changed possibility of the legal ?rm to make
pro?t when the tax rate is greater. Consider a small initial shadow economy.
A sharp decline in pro?t plxl reduces access to public goods, slowing down
expansion of the shadow economy. A minor decline in pro?t, however, makes
tax revenue and hence supply of public goods sustainable. Consumers can
move to the shadow economy with less concern of what happens to public
goods. When the shadow economy has reached more consumers, the sign
of (1=3¡ xi) changes, the accelerating secondary e¤ect disappears and the
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pro?t e¤ect starts to decelerate. Despite such dynamic mechanisms, the
economy settles down in an equilibrium with positive tax revenue and positive
supply of public goods as long as the pro?t of the legal ?rm, plxl; does not
vanish.
From a dynamic perspective, we have the following result: rising tax rate
tends to expand the shadow economy through the tax evasion e¤ect. There
is an associated public goods e¤ect under the requirement of balanced bud-
get, which accelerates or decelerates the expansion of the shadow economy,
depending on the possibility of the legal ?rm to sustain pro?tability when
the tax rate is raised.
3.3 Moral Norms in Control of Illicit Transactions
Morality as a Group Phenomenon We now introduce two mechanisms
to control illicit transactions. First, we introduce the values of consumers in
terms of their moral sentiments. Second, we introduce the cost of holding
cash which turns out to operate analogously to the tax on legal transactions.
In addition to their basic willingness to pay, consumers are now assumed
also to value self-esteem. Moreover, they are sensitive to social disapproval.
In other words, they care much of what they think of themselves and what the
other people think of them.22 The strength of self-esteem e¤ect is measured
by parameter s > 0 and it is uniform across people. Only deviants are willing
to give it up.
The moral sentiments of, say poor and rich are thus equal and indepen-
dent of, their incomes. The total marginal utility of consumers buying a legal
product is then grk + s and is uniformly distributed over [s; g + s]: Alterna-
tively, consumers can anonymously visit the illicit market with catching-up
probability »: If caught, they su¤er from social disapproval cost, z > 0:
The model of the previous section is now extended in that the disapproval
is assumed to be expressed by those people who adhere to the social norm
of visiting the legal market only. The disapproval e¤ect thereby becomes a
group phenomenon, eroding with the contraction of the legal market.23 In
terms of consumer valuation, the legal product thus is valued at grk while
the illegal product is valued at grk ¡ xl¢, where ¢ is the expected social
22Existence of moral sentiments has been well-known in economics ever since Adam
Smith (1976) and studied more recently by Frank (1987, 1988). The origin of those
sentiments has been traced both to genetic forces in evolutionary biology or to memes,
cultural genes, cf. Dawkins (1976).
23There is no particular need to introduce any restriction on whether it is the self-esteem
or the social disapproval which has greater weight in people?s valuation. The model allows
for both cases.
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punishment, ¢ = E[P ] with
P =
½
z with probability »
0 with probability 1¡ »:
We consider ful?lled expectations equilibrium. We assume further that
payments in the illicit market are made by cash. More e¢cient means of
payments dominate in the legal market. There is thus an extra cost of making
payments in the illicit market in terms of the cost of holding cash. The cost
di¤erential is denoted by ° > 0: It would be possible to interpret the model as
a cash-in-advance variety with pi measuring the amount of cash demanded.
Consumers (k; j) visiting the legal and illicit markets then have net util-
ities,
uk = grk + s ¡ (1 + ¿ ) pl; vj = grj ¡ xlz» ¡ (1 + °) pi: (11)
In our model, the mass of people will be endogenously distributed into
moral and immoral ones in terms of their behavior. In equilibrium people
thus di¤er by their factual behavior. Moral (honest) and immoral (dishonest)
behavior is endogenously determined and so is the strength of the social
disapproval e¤ect xlz». Morality as social capital is thus determined by the
moral network, the expected relative size of the group of people expressing
social disapproval in case of detection. The deviants24 are viewed as those
taking the risk of being subject to stigma.25
Denote again the marginal consumers by (m; n) where m is indi¤erent
between buying the legal and illicit product while n is indi¤erent between
buying the illicit product and buying none. Thus the marginal utility for any
consumer, say k, for buying the legal product is g(1¡ k): Then the marginal
utility for j for buying the illicit product is g(1¡ j)¡ »zxl: For the marginal
consumer, her net marginal utilities have to be equal g(1¡m)+s¡(1+¿)pl =
g(1¡ m)¡ »zxl ¡ (1 + °)pi:
The price di¤erential now satis?es (1+ ¿ )pl ¡ (1+ °)pi = s+ »zxl: Thus,
both the self-esteem e¤ect and the group e¤ect of moral sentiments are re-
?ected in the price di¤erential, as the legal producer can exploit them. For
the marginal consumer n; the net utility from buying the illicit product is
zero, (1¡n)g ¡ »zxl ¡ (1+ °)pi = 0: Noting that the n is the last buyer, i.e.
n = xl + xi; her net utility is (1¡ xl ¡ xi)g ¡ »zxl ¡ (1 + °)pi = 0: The total
production thus satis?es xl + xi = g ¡ »zxl ¡ (1 + °)pi:
24The deviants might value positively other deviants, like members in gangs of sub-
cultures. It would be easy to extend the model in this direction but for simplicity, we
abstract from it.
25The stigma e¤ect has previously been discussed in psychology by Puhl and Brownell
(2003) or Schulze and Angermeyer (2003).
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Solving for the prices
pi =
(1¡ xl ¡ xi)g ¡ xlz»
(1 + °)
; pl =
(1¡ xl ¡ xi) g + s
(1 + ¿ )
:
Nash equilibrium With reaction functions
xl =
g + s ¡ (1 + ¿ ) cl ¡ xi
2
; xi =
g ¡ (1 + z»)xl ¡ (1 + °) ci
2
;
we solve for the Nash equilibrium
xl =
2s+ g + (1 + °) ci ¡ 2 (1 + ¿) cl
3g ¡ z» (12)
xi =
(g ¡ z») g ¡ 2g (1 + °) ci ¡ (g + z») (s ¡ (1 + ¿ ) cl)
(3g ¡ z») g (13)
pl =
(g + 2s+ (1 + °) ci) g + (g ¡ z») (1 + ¿ ) cl
(3g ¡ z») (1 + ¿ ) (14)
pi =
(g ¡ z») (g + (1 + °) ci)¡ (g + z») (s ¡ (1 + ¿ ) cl)
(3g ¡ z») (1 + °) (15)
3.4 Competition under Morality
Comparative Statics We ?rst develop technically the comparative static
e¤ects. Their algebra is subject to condition g ¡ »z > 0: This condition only
states the natural requirement that the expected cost of punishment cannot
be greater than the maximal willingness to pay. Then, the equilibrium is
characterized by the following comparative static results
Table 1 Comparative statics
xl xi pl pi
s + - + -
z + - + -
» + - + -
° + - + §
¿ - + - +
cl - + + -
ci + - + §
These results are to be discussed below.
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Self-Esteem as Conscience and Social Punishment Comparative
static analysis shows the potentially powerful e¤ects of self-esteem and the
risk of being caught when deviating and being punished. Those e¤ects tend
to maintain the legal sector large. Evaluating we ?nd @xl=@s = 23g¡z» : This
is positive as 3g ¡ »z > 0: Self-esteem operates like a conscience for an
individual, supporting the legal production. The mechanism that the social
punishment e¤ect depends on the size of the legal sector is con?rmed by the
result @xl=@z =
»xl
3g¡z» .
The price e¤ects are non-trivial. This results from that the self-esteem
and social disapproval e¤ects tend to be priced not only in the illicit product.
Their e¤ect also spills over to the legal market. It is easy to see that the
net surplus of the marginal consumer in the legal market is lower when he
is subject to self-esteem. Insert the expressions for the quantity and price
from above in the surplus of the marginal consumer, g(1 ¡ m) + s ¡ (1 +
¿)pl and develop the partial derivative with respect to s: This suggests that
with consumers becoming more moral, they pay a price in terms of reduced
surplus. The marginal consumer is now the one who previously was a shadow
market visitor. They keep the option of returning to the shadow market. It
is easy to see that the greater is the shadow market, the more valuable is
this option. Pricing of the shadow market producer, however, reduces this
option value.26
3.5 La¤er Curve
The proponents of the view of government as revenue-maximizing Leviathan
which uses resources ine¢ciently obviously welcome the shadow economy.27
This section studies the e¤ects of illicit transactions on an economy?s La¤er-
curve. Suppose that the tax revenue, T; is only partly allocated to public
goods and that the government is able to extract a fraction, say 0 < y < 1
for its own use. Then the resources available for ?nancing public goods are
g = (1¡ y)T:
Assume that the government chooses the tax rate ¿ to maximize its tax
revenue collected from the sales of the legal ?rm, T = ¿plxl: We notice that
26Despite that the equilibrium outcome is characterized by strati?cation of consumers,
the shadow markets do not perform a screening function of people between "honest" and
"dishonest" in our model, as all consumers are ex ante identical in terms their preferences
for moral sentiments.
27Waste of tax revenue may result, for example, from in?uence or bribes by powerful
lobbies leading to ine¢cient public spending. Grossman (2002) shows that if the technology
of predation is su¢ciently e¤ective in a society, then having a "king" is better for everyone
even though the king maximizes the consumption of a ruling elite.
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such a government pro?le, though a burden on tax paying honest consumers,
is not necessarily detrimental to public goods production as an increase in
tax revenue means also an increase in the supply of public goods. What
matters is the magnitude of the fraction, y; which the government extracts.
We assume that y is constant. Then maximization of (1¡ y)T is equivalent
to maximizing T: Kanniainen and Pääkkönen (2004) have shown that with
low (positive) tax rates, tax revenue T = ¿plxl (La¤er curve) is increasing
in the tax rate. They also prove that the legal sector disappears at a certain
tax rate and that the La¤er curve has a unique maximum.
Production of public goods have con?icting e¤ects on the size of the legal
sector. The positive e¤ect rises if people understand that tax payments are
the precondition on availability of public goods. The negative e¤ect, however,
arises from people?s understanding that the government will spend part of
tax revenue to satisfy the demands by powerful lobby and interest groups. It
is the latter e¤ect which in addition to the free-riding incentive tends to lead
to expansion of the shadow economy. We let empirical data judge which of
the two e¤ects is the dominating one.
4 Econometric Analysis
4.1 Method
Causal models which incorporate latent variables have been utilized in es-
timating the size of the shadow economy by Aigner, Schneider and Ghosh
(1988), Giles (1999a,1999b) and Schneider (2000). The latent variables are
not directly observable, but have operational implications for relationships
among observable variables. The observable variables appear as causes of
the latent variables as well as indicators of latent variables. In this paper, we
apply MIMIC (multiple indicators, multiple causes) method, a variant of the
LISREL models, introduced originally by Zellner (1970) and Jöreskog and
Goldberger (1975).
Suppose all variables are measured around their respective population
means. It is assumed that the latent variable y¤ is determined by a set of
observable exogenous causes x1; :::; xk and a disturbance ²
y¤ = ®1x1 + ®2x2 + ::: + ®kxk + ²:
The latent variable, on the other hand, with disturbances u1; :::; um deter-
mines the set of observable indicators y1; :::; ym
y1 = ¯1y
¤ + u1, .... , ym = ¯my
¤ + um:
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In vector-form
y¤ = ®¶x+ ²; (16)
y = ¯y¤ + u; (17)
with E [²u0] = 00, E (²2 = ¾2) and E (u u0) = £2:
Substituting (16) to (17) the reduced-form relation is
y = ¯ (®¶x+ ²) + u = ¦0x+ v;
where the reduced-form coe¢cient matrix is
¦ = ®¯0;
and the reduced-form disturbance vector,
v = ¯²+ u;
has covariance matrix
- = E (vv0) = ¾2¯¯ 0 +£2:
Estimation of structural parameters is obtained through maximum likeli-
hood, making use of the restrictions implied in both the coe¢cient matrix ¦
and the covariance matrix of the error term º. The idea of MIMIC model is
that the latent variable accounts completely for the correlations of the indi-
cators. Once the e¤ects of the causal variables x and and the disturbance of
² on each of the indicators are removed, there is no correlation among indica-
tors. A MIMIC model thus uses observable data on causal variables and data
on observable indicator variables to predict the values for an unobservable
(latent) variable, the size of the shadow economy relative to the size of the
measured GDP.
4.2 Hypotheses and Data
The theoretical section suggests that the development and the size of the
shadow markets are linked to the following mechanisms and variables:
1. Tax rates
The higher the share of direct and indirect taxation is, the higher is
the shadow economy. We also suggest: The higher the share of social
security contributions is, the higher is the shadow economy.
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2. State regulation/intervention
The higher the state regulation (measured in share of public admin-
istrative employment in % of total employment) is, the higher is the
shadow economy.
3. Tax morale
The higher the tax morale is, the lower is the shadow economy. The
tax moral variable is based on data from the 1990 World Values Survey
(WVS) and the 1999 European Values Survey (EVS). The World Val-
ues Survey is a worldwide investigation of socio-cultural and political
change, based on representative national samples. It was ?rst carried
out in 1981-83, and subsequently in 1990-91, 1995-96 and 1999-2001.
To assess the level of tax morale in the WVS and the EVS, we use
the following question: "Please tell me for each of the following state-
ments whether you think it can always be justi?ed, never be justi?ed,
or something in between: Cheating on tax if you have the chance". The
question leads to a ten-scale index of tax morale with the two extreme
points "never justi?ed" and "always justi?ed". In our case, the natural
cut-o¤ point is at the value 1 on this scale index, if a high amount
of respondents assert that the cheating on tax is "never justi?able".
Then, our tax morale variable takes the value 0 if the respondent says
that cheating on tax is "never justi?ed", and 1 otherwise.
4. Public goods and state transfers
The higher the state transfers and/or public goods and the better the
quality of these goods and transfers are, the lower is the shadow econ-
omy.
5. Status of the economy
The worse the economy is, the greater is the shadow economy. This is
measured here in unemployment with the hypothesis: The higher the
unemployment is, the higher is the shadow economy. Another variable
is GDP per capita with the hypothesis: The higher the GDP per capita,
the lower the shadow economy.
6. Payment habits
The higher the share of cash payments the higher is the shadow econ-
omy.
These 6 hypotheses will be tested with the help of an econometric analysis
in order to explain the size and development of the shadow economy of 21
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industrialized OECD countries. In Table 2, the econometric estimation using
the MIMIC approach (latent estimation approach) is presented for the 21
industrialized and developed OECD countries for which we have data for
four points of time: 1990/91, 1994/95, 1997/98 and 1999/2000. As cause
variables we have the following ones:
² share of direct taxation (positive sign expected),
² share of indirect taxation (positive sign expected),
² share of social security contribution (positive sign expected),
² burden of state regulation, share of public administrative employment
relative total employment (positive sign expected),
² tax morale (positive sign expected ),
² state transfers, per capita (negative sign expected),
² unemployment quota (positive sign expected),
² GDP per capita (negative sign expected).
As indicator variables we have the following ones:
² employment quota, share of of population 18-64 (negative sign ex-
pected),
² average working time per week (negative sign expected),
² annual rate of GDP, adjusted for the mean of all 21 OECD countries
(negative sign expected),
² change of currency per capita (positive sign expected).
4.3 Estimation Results
To report our estimation results, we ?rst discuss the diagnostics from table 3.
The overall ?t of the model is tested using several statistics. Steiger?s (1990)
test-statistics (RMSEA test of ?t) obtains the value 0.004. RMSEA · 0:05
is typically considered "close ?t", Steiger (1990), Brown and Cudeck (1993).
The value of the Chi Square statistic is 8.46 which is su¢ciently small. The
p-value for multivariate normality is quite low. However, the AGFI-value,
0.739, is quite large.
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Table 2: MIMIC Estimation of the Shadow Economy. Data: 21 developed
OECD Countries, 1990/91, 1994/95, 1997/98, 1999/2000 and 2001/02.
Cause Variables Estimated Coe¢cients
Share of direct taxation (in % of GDP) ®1 = 0:410¤¤
(3.41)
Share of indirect taxation (in % of GDP) ®2 = 0:213¤
(1.92)
Share of social security contribution ®3 = 0:523¤¤
(in % of GDP) (4.59)
Burden of state regulation (share of ®4 = 0:203¤
public administrative employment (1.84)
in % of total employment)
Tax morale ®5 = 0:614¤¤
(4.06)
State transfers (per capita) ®6 = ¡0:189¤
(-1.85)
Unemployment quota ®7 = 0:399¤¤
(3.41)
GDP per capita ®8 = ¡0:134¤¤
(-3.64)
Indicator Variables Estimated Coe¢cients
Employment quota ¯9 = ¡0:713¤¤
(in % of population 18-64) (-3.49)
Average working time (per week) ¯10 = 1:00
(Residuum)
Annual rate of GDP (adjusted for the ¯11 = ¡0:345¤¤
mean of all 22 OECD countries) (-3.513)
Rate of change of currency per capita ¯11 = 0:384
¤¤
(4.71)
Note: t-statistics are given in parentheses; a t-statistic signi?cant at 1 % level
denoted by **, signi?cant at 5 % level denoted by *. One-sided t-test is used.
The estimated coe¢cients of all seven cause variables are statistically sig-
ni?cant and have the theoretically expected signs. We notice that unlike the
situation in a conventional regression model, the values of the estimated coef-
?cients can be compared in relative terms because of the normalization that
has been introduced (coe¢cient of the average working time ¯10 = ¡1:00:)
The estimated coe¢cients of the tax and social security burden variables are
not only signi?cant but taken together, they are quantitatively the most im-
portant ones. In the relative importance, they are followed by the tax morale
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variable which has a quite large coe¢cient. The state regulation variable also
obtains a signi?cant coe¢cient estimate. The transfer variable obtains a neg-
ative coe¢cient. It may allow for an interpretation that tax moral is a normal
good, becoming stronger if people are taken care of. This can also allow for
an interpretation that people understand that part of of taxes they pay result
in supply of public goods or income transfers to them. The positive and large
coe¢cient of the social security variable, however, makes this interpretation
somewhat shaky. People do not seem to appreciate the bene?t linked to their
contributions. Such an interpretation may, in turn, be possible in the light of
demographic development which makes people uncertain as to whether their
future consumption will be protected by the future pensions.
The results suggest the tax payers? attitude towards the state institutions
and governments tax policies is quite important in determining whether one
is engaged in shadow economy activities, or not. Also the shape of the
o¢cial economy measured in unemployment and GDP per capita have an
important in?uence on the size and development of the shadow economy of
these 21 OECD countries. Turning to the four indicator variables, they all
have a statistically signi?cant in?uence and the estimated coe¢cients have
the theoretically expected signs. The quantitatively most important are the
unemployment quota and the rate of change of currency per capita.
Table 3: MIMIC model: diagnostic tests28
Test-statistics
RMSEA1) = 0.004 TMNCV3) = 0.043
(p-value = 0.9412) AGFI4) = 0.739
Chi-square2) = 8.46 N5) = 105
(p-value = 0.903) D.F.6) = 65
For the calculation of the size and the evolution of the shadow economy for
the 21 OECD countries, a combination of the MIMIC method with a currency
28Notes: 1) Steiger?s (1990) Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RM-
SEA) test of ?t. RMSEA-value varies between 0.0 and 1.0. RMSEA < 0.05 means
close ?t.
2) The Chi Square statistic in Table 3 tests the speci?cation of the MIMIC
model against the alternative that the covariance matrix of the observed variables
is unconstrained (see Jöreskog and Sörbom (1993) and Giles (1999b).
3) Test of Multivariate Normality for Continuous Variables (TMNCV); p-value
of skewness and kurtosis, cf. Mardia (1970).
4) Test of Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index (AGFI), varying between 0 to 1.
Good ?t is suggested if AGFI is close to 1.
5) Number of observations.
6) The degrees of freedom are determined by 0:5¢ (p + q) (p + q + 1) ¡ t ; with p =
number of indicators; q = number of causes; t = the number of free parameters.
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demand method is used. The results are presented in Table 4 for 1989/90,
1994/95, 1997/98, 1999/2000, 2001/02, and 2002/03. Considering the latest
period 2002/03, Greece is the country with the largest shadow economy,
amounting to 28.3% of o¢cial GDP. It is followed by Italy with 26.2% and
Portugal and Spain with 22.3% share. The middle class includes important
central European economies like Germany (16.8%), France (14.8%) and the
Nordic welfare states, Sweden (18.7%), Norway (18.7 %), Finland (17.6 %)
and Denmark (17.5 %). In the lower end are the USA (8.6 %), Switzerland
(9.5 %), Austria (10.8 %) and Japan (11.0 %).
As another result, we ?nd a dramatic increase of shadow economies dur-
ing the 90s throughout the OECD countries in our sample. On the average,
the shadow economy was 13.2% in these countries in 1989/90, rising to 16.8%
towards 1999/2000. This development is consistent with the view that ris-
ing tax burden intensi?es incentives to participate in underground activities.
Considering the results on the turnover of the millennium 2000, we realize
that for the majority of the OECD countries, the shadow economy is no
more increasing but slightly decreasing. This development can be linked
to intensi?ed tax competition, limiting the expansion of the public sectors
and reducing the (total) tax rates in those countries. The only exceptions
in our sample are the German speaking economies, Germany, Austria and
Switzerland where the size of the shadow economy has continued to increase,
converging towards the mean of the sample.
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Table 4: The Size of the Shadow Economy in OECD Countries
Size of the Shadow Economy (in % of GDP) using the Currency
Demand and MIMIC Method
OECD-Countries Average
1989/90
Average
1994/95
Average
1997/98
Average
1999/2000
Average
2001/021)
Average
2002/031)
Countries with Large Shadow Economies
1. Greece 22.6 28.6 29.0 28.7 28.5 28.3
2. Italy 22.8 26.0 27.3 27.1 27.0 26.2
3. Portugal 15.9 22.1 23.0 22.6 22.4 22.2
4. Spain 2) 16.1 22.4 23.3 22.8 22.6 22.4
Countries with Medium Sized Shadow Economies
5. Australia 10.1 13.5 14.0 14.3 14.1 13.8
6. Belgium 19.3 21.5 22.5 22.2 22.0 21.5
7. Canada 12.8 14.8 16.2 16.0 15.8 15.4
8. Denmark 10.8 17.8 18.3 18.0 17.9 17.5
9. Germany 11.8 13.5 14.9 16.0 16.3 16.8
10. Finland 13.4 18.2 18.9 18.1 18.0 17.6
11. France 9.0 14.5 14.9 15.2 15.0 14.8
12. Great Britain 9.6 12.5 13.0 12.7 12.5 12.3
13. Ireland 11.0 15.4 16.2 15.9 15.7 15.5
14. Netherlands 11.9 13.7 13.5 13.1 13.0 12.8
15. New Zealand3) 9.2 11.3 11.9 12.8 12.6 12.4
16. Norway 14.8 18.2 19.6 19.1 19.0 18.7
17. Sweden 15.8 19.5 19.9 19.2 19.1 18.7
Countries with Small Shadow Economies
18. Austria 6.9 8.6 9.0 9.8 10.6 10.8
19. Japan 8.8 10.6 11.1 11.2 11.1 11.0
20. Switzerland 6.7 7.8 8.1 8.6 9.4 9.5
21. USA 6.7 8.8 8.9 8.7 8.7 8.6
Unweighted
average over 21
OECD countries
13.2 15.7 16.7 16.8 16.7 16.4
Sources: Own calculations
1) Preliminary values.
2) The ?gures are calculated using the MIMIC-method and currency demand
approach. Source: Giles (1999b); values for 1999/2000, 2001/2002 and 2002/2003
own calculations.
3) The ?gures have been calculated for 1989/90, 1994/95 and 1997/98 from
Mauleon (1998) and for the later periods own calculations.
23
5 Final Remarks
The econometric results provide support for the proposed causes for shadow
economies. Taxation and social security variables were found to be signi?-
cant. As a policy implication, this ?nding suggests that an increase in the size
of the public sector with high tax burden has side-e¤ects: hidden economy
expands. Such an implication provides support for the view that by control-
ling tax burden, tax competition also provides brakes for shadow economies
while the tax harmonization may have the opposite e¤ect. The econometric
success with the tax moral variable in control of the shadow economy points
to the importance of social capital in the society. It appears also important
to make sure that the public is informed of the link between the bene?ts as-
sociated with their contribution. In terms of our theoretical model, the state
of the o¢cial economy is re?ected in the willingness to pay function. Such
e¤ects are captured by the unemployment variable and the GDP per capita
variable which both turned out to be signi?cant. As to employment pro-
moting policies, the social bene?ts may thus be greater than often thought.
The signi?cant negative coe¢cient of the state transfer variable points to the
possibility that the transfers might operate like a bribe on people, persuading
them out of the shadow economy.
The limits to shadow economy are sensitive to economic performance of
an economy. We indeed observe a rather substantial increase of the estimated
size of the shadow economy in the 90s in all countries included in data. Our
estimation results with the MIMIC approach allow us to link this develop-
ment to the rising total tax rate in the OECD economies. There is, how-
ever, substantial cross-country variation in the development of the shadow
economies over time. Our estimates suggest that the shadow economy has
started to shrink somewhat in the late 1990s up to 2003 in most countries
included in our sample. This is again consistent with our model and the fact
that the total tax rate, for example in the EU-area, has started on the av-
erage to decline as tax policies have adjusted to intensi?ed tax competition.
Only in small sub-set of our sample, i.e. Germany, Austria and Switzerland,
the shadow economy has expanded also over the past years. This ?ndings
can perhaps best be explained in terms of highly regulated labor markets and
the overall tax burden in those economies which has remained high. Via this
development, the share of their shadow economies is approaching the OECD
average.
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